


OWASP Top 10 for Agentic Applications Global Kick-off



Welcome!


The banner features the OWASP GenAI Security Project logo with the URL genai.owasp.org. It includes a stylized dragonfly icon and the text 'Agentic Security Initiative'. The main title 'Top 10 for Agentic App Security Global Kick-off' is prominently displayed in blue. Below it, it says 'Join the Global Call August 6th 9am-10am PST' and 'or Join In-person'. A globe icon is centered, with four locations marked: LAS VEGAS (Black Hat), TEL AVIV, LONDON, and ATHENS. Each location has a small human icon and a yellow dot on the globe.

Our Agenda Today

- ✓ Introduce the Agentic Security Initiative
- ✓ Preview the public draft of our OWASP Top 10 for Agentic applications
- ✓ Explain how you can become part of our public consultation and help shape the final release

Agentic Security Initiative

Part of the GenAI Security Project



The Top 10 for LLM for LLM and Gen AI has become one of many initiatives the project now leads – we are one of them

Guidance & Resources

- ↗ [Initiative Overview Blog](#)
- ⬇ [Agentic AI – Threats and Mitigations](#)
- 🔗 [Agentic AI Threat Navigator](#)
- 🔗 [Multi-Agent System Threat Modeling](#)

Get Involved

- ✳ [Slack: team-llm-autonomous-agents](#)
- ⬇ [Initiative Charter](#)

Initiative Lead(s)

- 👤 [John Sotiropoulos](#)
- 👤 [Ron F. Del Rosario](#)
- ✳ [Join the OWASP Slack Workspace](#)

<https://genai.owasp.org/initiatives/#agenticinitiative>

Expert-backed Community



Apostol Vassilev
Adversarial AI Lead
at NIST



Hyrum Anderson
CAMLIS Cofounder, AI
Security Pioneer,
CISCO



Vasilios Mavroudis
Principal Research
Scientist, Allan
Turing Institute



Josh Collier
Principal
Researcher,
Allan Turing
Institute



Alejandro Saucedo
Linux Foundation,
Advisor @ UN, EU,
ACM



Chris Hughes
Host of Resilient
Cyber, Cyber
Security Author



**Michael
Burgundy**
OWASP AISVS
Co-Chair &
Zenity CTO



Peter Bryan
Principal AI
Security
Research Lead-
AI Red Team
Microsoft



Egor Pushkin
Chief
Architect, Data
and AI at
Oracle Cloud



Matt Sanner
Security Leader
at AWS,
Elected Board
Member at
CoSAI



Dan Jones
Principal
Researcher
AI Red Team
at Microsoft




Steve Wilson
GenAI Security
Project Founder
&Chair, Chief AI
and Product
Officer at
Exabeam

Secure Agentic Lifecycle



Code Samples and Developer Validation



A screenshot of a GitHub repository interface. The repository is named "www-project-top-10-for-large-language-model-applications". The main branch is "main". The repository has 984723 commits, last updated a week ago. The commit message for the latest commit is "ASI folder reorganisation and 0.5 initial candidate entries". The commit date is "last week". The repository structure shows several subfolders: "autogen", "badrock", "crewai", "custom_code/ai_recruiter", "langraph", and "swarm". Each folder has a commit message indicating the purpose of the changes.



A screenshot of the Agentic AI CTF DEMO app. The interface includes a "Meet FinBot" section with an image of a white robot, a "Security Agreement" section with a "SIGN" button, and a "Participation Policy" section with a "Read CTF Guidelines" button.




A promotional graphic for the Agentic AI CTF DEMO at DEFCON 33. It features the text "Join Us At DEFCON 33", "Friday August 9th", "Insecure Agents Hackathon", "11am - 2PM PST", and "Register Now!". It includes a QR code and the text "OWASP COMMUNITY ROOM Las Vegas Convention Center".


New! Agentic CTF App

Product Adoption

18 Solutions



Agentic Threat and Mitigations Coverage



DRAFT Not For Release

Active Feedback

Large Scale Feedback Surveys, Open Workshops, Expert Panels



Including early adopters, cross-references, and dedicated research



Microsoft

Taxonomy of Failure Mode in Agentic AI Systems

Proposal - MAS(ec)

Klaudia Krawiecka & Christian Schroeder de Witt

July 3, 2025

1 Introduction

While studying the Multi-Agent System Threat Modeling guide, we identified several areas where the existing taxonomy could benefit from additional refinement. This document proposes a taxonomy of failure modes that complement the work of OWASP. The following sections outline these proposed threat categories, illustrate how they manifest in practice, and compare their coverage to the OWASP guide.

1.1 Terminology: Agent Roles in Multi-Agent Systems

In this document, we refer to common functional roles observed in multi-agent system architectures (e.g., AutoGen, Refinement, BabyAGL and Toolformer). Although these agentic frameworks do not explicitly define the aforementioned roles, we adopt the following terminology to support consistent threat modeling:

- **Planner/Orchestrator (i.e., Subplanner):** An agent responsible for decomposing an overall plan into subplans or subtasks. Planners often interact with other agents.
- **Executor:** An agent that carries out specific actions or tool invocations in service of a plan. It may rely on APIs, external tools, or environments.
- **Verifier:** An agent that passively evaluates the validity, safety, or accuracy of the outputs produced by other agents, often acting as a quality control layer.
- **Refiner:** An agent that actively modifies the outputs produced by other agents, often acting as active quality assurance (in contrast to the passive Verifier).

Recent Changes



 **Agentic Protocols** like **MCP, A2A, and ACP** define how agents communicate, delegate, and trust each other – but often lack strong attestation, authentication, or context control.


 **Distributed Multi-Agent Systems** (e.g. **Agent Cards, Registries**) introduce **decentralized execution** and **dynamic task assignment**, which attackers can spoof or hijack.

 **Supply Chain Complexity**: Agents now become dynamic components depending on tools, models, plugins – blurring the line between "runtime behaviour" and "pre-baked vulnerability".

 **Real-World Exploits** are already exposing these weaknesses, demonstrating:

- Goal Manipulation and Agent Hijacking
- Rogue agent impersonation
- Toolchain-based privilege misuse
- And more

Security Standards At Pace



Remain
Up-To
Date

Practical &
Concise
advice



Agentic
Research

Hackathons

Agentic
Top 10

Cheat
sheets


Why a Top 10?



Where do I start?



What is the top AI security challenge in your organization?



Our Threat Taxonomy Is Our Baseline



AGENCY & REASONING

- **T06.** Intent Breaking and Goal Manipulation
- **T07.** Misaligned and Deceptive Behaviours
- **T08.** Repudiation and Untraceability



MEMORY AND CONTEXT

- **T01.** Memory Poisoning
- **T04** Cascading Hallucinations



TOOLS & EXECUTION

- **T02.** Tool Misuse
- **T03.** Privilege Compromise
- **T04.** Resource Overload
- **T11.** Unexpected RCE and Code Attacks



IDENTITY & AUTHENTICATION

- **T09** Identity Spoofing and Impersonation



HUMAN ENGAGEMENT

- **T10** Overwhelming Human-in-the-Loop (HITL)
- **T15**, Human Trust Manipulation



MULTI-AGENCY


- **T12** Agent Communication Poisoning
- **T13.** Rogue Agents
- **T14** Human Attacks

How did we start our Top 10?

Review Existing Feedback

Initial Review Exploits and Incidents

Internal Expert Discussion



Grouping of Existing Threats

- Allow new entries
- Supports further development of the baseline taxonomy
- Preserves investment in our Threats and Mitigations

Top Ten for Agentic Applications 0.5

ASI01	Agent Behaviour Hijack	Manipulating an agent's goals plans to pursue attacker-aligned objectives.
ASI02	Tool Misuse and Exploitation	Tricking agents into using their tools in harmful or unintended ways.
ASI03	Identity & Privilege Abuse	Impersonating agents or escalating access through identity or auth and access permissions weaknesses.
ASI04	Agentic Supply Chain Vulnerabilities	Introducing insecure models, agents , tools or artefacts compromise agent integrity.
ASI05	Unexpected Code Execution (RCE)	Triggering unauthorized or unsafe code execution through agent behaviors.
ASI06	Memory & Context Poisoning	Corrupting agent memory or context to distort reasoning and decision-making.
ASI07	Insecure Inter-Agent Communication	Poisoning messages or abusing protocols between agents to alter behavior.
ASI08	Cascading Failures	Faults or hallucinations propagate through agents, causing compounded failures.
ASI09	Human-Agent Trust Exploitation	Exploiting over-trust or fatigue in human oversight to enable agent misuse including model deceptive behaviours
ASI10	Rogue Agents	Malicious or compromised agents acting autonomously to deceive, disrupt, or exfiltrate.


Example Entry



https://github.com/OWASP/www-project-top-10-for-large-language-model-applications/tree/main/initiatives/agent_security_initiative/agentic-top-10/0.5-initial-candidates

What's next?

This is deliberately an early draft to start the conversation and involve you



- New Submissions
- Working Groups per Entry
- Alignment Reviews (AIVSS Core Risks, MAS, other)
- Review Workshops
- Exploit and Incidence Research
- Survey & Votes

Be Part of our Effort

- Register interest to
 - Be notified for news, surveys, and votes
 - Be part of our Working Groups and Review Sessions

<https://forms.gle/Q0TUQgCA8KfTYKwy7>
-
- Submit Amendments or new entries via GitHub
 - https://github.com/OWASP/www-project-top-10-for-large-languag e-model-applications/tree/main/initiatives/agent_security_initiative
-
- Join the team
 - Slack channel:
 - Weekly calls every Monday 5:30pm-6:30pm
 - Details on how to join

<https://genai.owasp.org/initiatives/#agenticinitiative>



**Thank you!
Register here
for next steps**

